Information Theoretic Security for Broadcasting of Two Encrypted Sources
  under Side-Channel Attacks by Santoso, Bagus & Oohama, Yasutada
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
05
94
0v
4 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
 M
ar 
20
19
Information Theoretic Security for Broadcasting of
Two Encrypted Sources under Side-Channel Attacks
Bagus Santoso and Yasutada Oohama
University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan
Email: {santoso.bagus,oohama}@uec.ac.jp
Abstract—We consider the secure communication problem for
broadcasting of two encrypted sources. The sender wishes to
broadcast two secret messages via two common key cryptosys-
tems. We assume that the adversary can use the side-channel,
where the side information on common keys can be obtained via
the rate constraint noiseless channel. To solve this problem we
formulate the post encryption coding system. On the information
leakage on two secrete messages to the adversary, we provide an
explicit sufficient condition to attain the exponential decay of this
quantity for large block lengths of encrypted sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider the problem of strengthening the
security of broadcasting secret sources encripted by common
key criptsystems under the situation where the running cript-
systems have some potential problems. More precisely, we
consider two cryptosystems described as follows: two sources
X1 and X2, respectively, are encrypted in a node to C1 and
C2 using secret key K1 and K2. The cipher texts C1 and C2,
respectively, are sent through public communication channels
to the sink nodes 1 and 2. For each i, at the sink node i, Xi is
decrypted from Ci using Ki. In this paper we assume we have
two potentical problems in the above two cryptsystems. One is
that the two common keys used in the above systems may have
correlation. The other is that the adversary can use the side-
channel, where the side information on two common keys can
be obtained via the rate constraint noiseless channel. To solve
this problem we formulate the post encryption coding system.
In this communication system, we evaluate the information
leakage on two secrete messages to the adversary. We provide
an explicit sufficient condition for the information leakage to
decay exponentially as the block length of encrypted source
tends to infinity.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Preliminaries
In this subsection, we show the basic notations and related
consensus used in this paper.
Random Source of Information and Key: For each i = 1, 2,
let Xi be a random variable from a finite set Xi. For each
i = 1, 2, let {Xi,t}
∞
t=1 be two stationary discrete memoryless
sources(DMS) such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., Xi,t take
values in finite set Xi and has the same distribution as that of
Xi denoted by pXi = {pXi(xi)}xi∈Xi . The stationary DMS
{Xi,t}
∞
t=1, are specified with pXi .
We next define the two keys used in the two common
cryptosystems. For each i = 1, 2, let (K1,K2) be a pair of
two correlated random variables taken from the same finite set
X1 ×X2. Let {(K1,t,K2,t}
∞
t=1 be a stationary discrete mem-
oryless source such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., (K1,t,K2,t)
takes values in X1× X2 and has the same distribution as that
of (K1,K2) denoted by
pK1K2 = {pK1K2(k1, k2)}(k1,k2)∈X1×X2 .
The stationary DMS {(K1,t,K2,t}
∞
t=1 is specified with pK1K2 .
In this paper we assume that for each i = 1, 2, the marginal
distribution pKi is the uniform distribution over Xi.
Random Variables and Sequences: We write the sequence
of random variables with length n from the information
sources as follows: Xni := Xi,1Xi,2 · · ·Xi,n, i = 1, 2.
Similarly, the strings with length n of Xni are written as
xni := xi,1xi,2 · · ·xi,n ∈ X
n
i . For (x
n, xn2 ) ∈ X
n
1 × X
n
2 ,
pXn1 Xn2 (x
n, xn2 ) stands for the probability of the occurrence
of (xn, xn2 ). When the information source is memoryless
specified with pX1X2 , we have the following equation holds:
pXn1 Xn2 (x
n
1 , x
n
2 ) =
n∏
t=1
pX1X2(x1,t, x2,t).
In this case we write pXn1 Xn2 (x
n
1 , x
n
2 ) as p
n
X1X2
(xn1 , x
n
2 ).
Similar notations are used for other random variables and
sequences.
Consensus and Notations: Without loss of generality, through-
out this paper, we assume that X1 and X2 are finite fields. The
notation ⊕ is used to denote the field addition operation, while
the notation ⊖ is used to denote the field subtraction operation,
i.e., a ⊖ b = a ⊕ (−b) for any elements a, b from the same
finite field. All discussions and theorems in this paper still
hold althoughX1 and X2 are different finite fields. However,
for the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation for field
addition and subtraction for both X1 and X2. Throughout this
paper all logarithms are taken to the base natural.
B. Basic System Description
In this subsection we explain the basic system setting and
basic adversarial model we consider in this paper. First, let the
information source and the key be generated independently by
three different parties Sgen,1, Sgen,2 and Kgen respectively. In
our setting, we assume the followings.
• The random keysKn1 andK
n
2 are generated by Kgen from
uniform distribution.
Fig. 1. Side-channel attacks to the two Shannon cipher systems.
• The key Kn1 is correlated to K
n
2 .
• The sources Xn1 and X
n
2 are generated by Sgen and are
correlated to each other.
• The sources are independent to the keys.
Next, let the two correlated random sources Xn1 and X
n
2 ,
respectively from Sgen,1 and Sgen,2 be sent to two separated
nodes L1 and L2. And let two random key (sources) K
n
1 and
Kn2 from Kgen be also sent separately to L1 and L2. Further
settings of our system are described as follows. Those are also
shown in Fig. 1.
1) Separate Sources Processing: For each i = 1, 2, at the
node i, X
n
i is encrypted with the key K
n
i using the
encryption function Enci. The ciphertext C
n
i of X
n
i is
given by
Cni := Enci(X
n
i ) = X
n
i ⊕K
n
i .
2) Transmission: Next, the ciphertexts Cn1 and C
n
2 , re-
spectively are sent to the information processing center
D1 and D2 through two public communication channels.
Meanwhile, the keys Kn1 and K
n
2 , respectively are
sent to D1 and D2 through two private communication
channels.
3) Sink Nodes Processing: For each i = 1, 2, in Di, we
decrypt the ciphertext Cni using the key K
n
i through
the corresponding decryption procedure Deci defined
by Deci(C
n
i ) = C
n
i ⊖ K
n
i . It is obvious that we can
correctly reproduce the source output Xn from Cni and
Kni by the decryption function Deci.
Side-Channel Attacks by Eavesdropper Adversary: An adver-
sary A eavesdrops the public communication channel in the
system. The adversary A also uses a side information obtained
by side-channel attacks. Let Z be a finite set and let W :
X1 ×X2 → Z be a noisy channel. Let Z be a channel output
from W for the input random variable K . We consider the
discrete memoryless channel specified with W . Let Zn ∈ Zn
be a random variable obtained as the channel output by
connecting (Kn1 ,K
n
2 ) ∈ X
n
1 × X
n
2 to the input of channel.
We write a conditional distribution on Zn given (Kn1 ,K
n
2 ) as
Wn = {Wn(zn|kn1 , k
n
2 )}(kn1 ,kn2 ,zn)∈Xn1 ×Xn2 ×Zn
.
Fig. 2. Post-encryption coding system.
Since the channel is memoryless, we have
Wn(zn|kn1 , k
n
2 ) =
n∏
t=1
W (zt|k1,t, k2,t). (1)
On the above output Zn of Wn for the input (Kn1 ,K
n
2 ), we
assume the followings.
• The two random pairs (X1, X2), (K1,K2) and the ran-
dom variable Z , satisfy (X1, X2) ⊥ (K1,K2, Z), which
implies that (Xn1 , X
n
2 ) ⊥ (K
n
1 ,K
n
2 , Z
n).
• W is given in the system and the adversary A can not
control W .
• By side-channel attacks, the adversary A can access Zn.
We next formulate side information the adversaryA obtains by
side-channel attacks. For each n = 1, 2, · · · , let ϕ
(n)
A : Z
n →
M
(n)
A be an encoder function. Set ϕA := {ϕ
(n)
A }n=1,2,···. Let
R
(n)
A :=
1
n
log ||ϕA|| =
1
n
log |M
(n)
A |
be a rate of the encoder function ϕ
(n)
A . For RA > 0, we set
F
(n)
A (RA) := {ϕ
(n)
A : R
(n)
A ≤ RA}.
On encoded side information the adversary A obtains we
assume the following.
• The adversary A, having accessed Zn, obtains the en-
coded additional information ϕ
(n)
A (Z
n). For each n =
1, 2, · · · , the adversary A can design ϕ
(n)
A .
• The sequence {R
(n)
A }
∞
n=1 must be upper bounded by a
prescribed value. In other words, the adversary A must
use ϕ
(n)
A such that for some RA and for any sufficiently
large n, ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA).
As a soultion to the side channel attacks, we consider the
post-encryption coding system. This system is shown in Fig.
2.
1) Encoding at Source node i, i = 1, 2: For each i = 1, 2,
we first use ϕ
(n)
i to encode the ciphertext C
n
i = X
n
i ⊕
Kni . Formal definition of ϕ
(n)
i is ϕ
(n)
i : X
n
i →X
mi
i . Let
C˜mii = ϕ
(n)
i (C
n
i ). Instead of sending C
n
i , we send C˜
mi
i
to the public communication channel.
2) Decoding at Sink Nodes Di, i = 1, 2: For each
i = 1, 2, Di receives C˜
mi
i from public communication
channel. Using common key Kni and the decoder func-
tion Ψ
(n)
i : X
m
i × X
n
i → X
n
i , Di outputs an estimation
Xˆni = Ψ
(n)
i (C˜
mi
i ,K
n
i ) of X
n
i .
On Reliability and Security: From the description of our sys-
tem in the previous section, the decoding process in our
system above is successful if X̂n = Xn holds. Combining
this and (6), it is clear that the decoding error probabilities
pe,i, i = 1, 2, are as follows:
pe,i =pe(ϕ
(n)
i ,Ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi) := Pr[Ψ
(n)
i (ϕ
(n)
i (X
n
i )) 6= X
n
i ].
Set M
(n)
A = ϕ
(n)
A (Z
n). The information leakage ∆(n) on
(Xn1 , X
n
2 ) from (C˜
m1
1 , C˜
m2
2 ,M
(n)
A ) is measured by the mutual
information between (Xn1 , X
n
2 ) and (C˜
m1
1 , C˜
m2
2 , M
(n)
A ). This
quantity is formally defined by
∆(n) = ∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2)
:= I(Xn1X
n
2 ; C˜
m2
1 , C˜
m2
2 ,M
(n)
A ).
Reliable and Secure Framework:
Definition 1: A pair (R1, R2) is achievable under RA >
0 for the system Sys if there exists two sequences {(ϕ
(n)
i ,
Ψ
(n)
i )}n≥1, i = 1, 2, such that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃n0 = n0(ǫ) ∈ N0,
∀n ≥ n0, we have for i = 1, 2,
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri,
pe(ϕ
(n)
i ,Ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi) ≤ ǫ,
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2) ≤ ǫ.
Definition 2: (Reliable and Secure Rate Region) Let
RSys(pX1X2 , pK1K2 ,W ) denote the set of all (RA, R) such
that R is achievable under RA. We call RSys(pX1X2 , pK1K2 ,
W ) the reliable and secure rate region.
Definition 3: A five tuple (R1, R2, E1, E2, F ) is achievable
under
RA > 0 for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ
(n)
i ,
Ψ
(n)
i )}n≥1, i = 1, 2, such that ∀ǫ > 0, ∃n0 = n0(ǫ) ∈ N0, ∀n
≥ n0, we have for i = 1, 2,
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri,
pe(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi) ≤ e
−n(Ei−ǫ),
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2) ≤ e
−n(F−ǫ).
Definition 4: (Rate, Reliability, and Security Region) Let
DSys(pX1X2 , pK1K2 ,W ) denote the set of all (RA, R,E, F )
such that (R1, R2, E1, E2, F ) is achievable under RA. We call
DSys(pX1X2 , pK1K2 ,W ) the rate, reliability, and security
region.
Fig. 3. Our proposed solution: linear encoders as privacy amplifiers.
III. PROPOSED IDEA: AFFINE ENCODER AS PRIVACY
AMPLIFIER
For each n = 1, 2, · · · , let φ
(n)
i : X
n
i → X
mi
i be a linear
mapping. We define the mapping φ
(n)
i by
φ
(n)
i (x
n
i ) = x
n
i Ai for x
n
i ∈ X
n
i , (2)
where Ai is a matrix with n rows and mi columns. Entries
of Ai are from Xi. We fix b
mi
i ∈ X
mi
i . Define the mapping
ϕ
(n)
i : X
n
i → X
mi
i by
ϕ
(n)
i (k
n
i ) :=φ
(n)
i (k
n
i )⊕ b
mi
i
=kni Ai ⊕ b
mi
i , for k
n
i ∈ X
n
i . (3)
The mapping ϕ
(n)
i is called the affine mapping induced by
the linear mapping φ
(n)
i and constant vector b
mi
i ∈ X
mi
i . By
the definition (3) of ϕ
(n)
i , those satisfy the following affine
structure:
ϕ
(n)
i (x
n
i ⊕ k
n
i )(x
n
i ⊕ k
n
i )Ai ⊕ b
mi
i = x
n
i Ai ⊕ (k
n
i Ai ⊕ b
mi
i )
= φ
(n)
i (x
n
i )⊕ ϕ
(n)
i (k
n
i ), for x
n
i , k
n
i ∈ X
n
i . (4)
Next, let ψ
(n)
i be the corresponding decoder for φ
(n)
i such
that ψ
(n)
i : X
mi
i → X
n
i . Note that ψ
(n)
i does not have a linear
structure in general.
Description of Proposed Procedure: We describe the proce-
dure of our privacy amplified system as follows.
1) Encoding at Source node i, i = 1, 2: First, we use
ϕ
(n)
i to encode the ciphertext C
n
i = X
n
i ⊕ K
n
i Let
C˜mii = ϕ
(n)
i (C
n
i ). Then, instead of sending C
n, we send
C˜mii to the public communication channel. By the affine
structure (4) of encoder we have that
C˜mii = ϕ
(n)
i (X
n
i ⊕K
n
i )
= φ
(n)
i (X
n
i )⊕ ϕ
(n)
i (K
n
i ) = X˜
mi
i ⊕ K˜
mi
i , (5)
where we set X˜mii := φ
(n)
i (X
n
i ), K˜
mi
i := ϕ
(n)
i (K
n
i ).
2) Decoding at Sink Node Di, i = 1, 2: First, using
the linear encoder ϕ
(n)
i , Di encodes the key K
n
i re-
ceived through private channel into K˜mii =ϕ
(n)
i (K
n
i ).
Receiving C˜mii from public communication channel, Di
computes X˜mii in the following way. From (5), we have
that the decoder Di can obtain X˜
mi
i = φ
(n)
i (X
n
i ) by
subtracting K˜mii = ϕ
(n)
i (K
n
i ) from C˜
mi
i . Finally, Di
outputs X̂ni by applying the decoder ψ
(n)
i to X˜
mi
i as
follows:
X̂ni = ψ
(n)
i (X˜
mi
i ) = ψ
(n)
i (φ
(n)
i (X
n
i )). (6)
Our privacy amplified system described above is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we state our main results. To describe our
results we define several functions and sets. Let U be an
auxiliary random variable taking values in a finite set U . We
assume that the joint distribution of (U,Z,K1,K2) is
pUZK1K2(u, z, k1, k2) = pU (u)pZ|U (z|u)pK1K2|Z(k1, k2|z).
The above condition is equivalent to U ↔ Z ↔ (K1,K2).
In the following argument for convenience of descriptions of
definitions we use the following notations:
R3 := R1 +R2,X3 := X1 ×X2,
k3 := (k1, k2),K3 := (K1,K2).
For each i = 1, 2, 3, we simply write pi = pUZKi . Specifically,
for i = 3, we have p3 = pUZK1K2 = p. Define the three sets
of probability distribution p = pUZK1K2 by
P(pZKi) :={pUZKi : |U| ≤ |Z|+ 1, U ↔ Z ↔ Ki},
i = 1, 2, 3.
For i = 1, 2, 3, set
Ri(pi) := {(RA, Ri) : RA, Ri ≥ 0,
RA ≥ I(Z;U), Ri ≥ H(Ki|U)},
Ri(pZKi) :=
⋃
pi∈P(pZKi )
Ri(pi).
The two regions Ri(pZKi), i = 1, 2 have the same form
as the region appearing as the admissible rate region in the
one-helper source coding problem posed and investigated by
Ahlswede and Körner [1].
We can show that the region Ri(pZKi), i = 1, 2, and
R3(pZK1K2) satisfy the following property.
Property 1:
a) The region R(pZKi), i = 1, 2, is a closed convex subset
of R2+. The regionR3(pZK1K2) is a closed convex subset
of R3+.
b) The bound |U| ≤ |Z| + 1 is sufficient to describe
Ri(pZKi), i = 1, 2, 3.
We next explain that the region Ri(pZKi), i = 1, 2, and
R3(pZK1K2) can be expressed with a family of supporting
hyperplanes. To describe this result we define three sets of
probability distributions on U ×Z ×X1×X2 by
P˜(pZKi) :={p = pUZKi : |U| ≤ |X |, U ↔ Z ↔ Ki},
i = 1, 2, 3.
For i = 1, 2, 3, and µ ∈ [0, 1], define
R(µ)(pZKi) := min
p∈P˜(pZKi )
{µIp(Z;U) + µ¯Hp(Ki|U)} ,
Furthermore, for i = 1, 2, 3, define
Rsh,i(pZKi) :=
⋂
µ∈[0,1]
{(RA, Ri) : µRA + µ¯Ri
≥ R(µ)(pZKi)}.
Then we have the following property.
Property 2:
a) The bound |U| ≤ |Z| is sufficient to describe R
(µ)
i (
pZKi), i = 1, 2, and R
(µ)
3 (pZK1K2).
b) For every µ ∈ [0, 1], we have
min
(RA,Ri)∈R(pZKi )
{µRA + µ¯Ri}
= R(µ)(pZKi), i = 1, 2, (7)
min
(RA,R1,R2)∈R(pZK1K2 )
{µRA + µ¯(R1 +R2)}
= R(µ)(pZK1K2). (8)
c) For any pZK1K2 we have
Rsh,i(pZKi) = R(pZKi), i = 1, 2, (9)
Rsh,3(pZK1K2) = R3(pZK1K2). (10)
We define several quantities to state a result on DSys(
pX1X2 , pK1K2 ,W ). Let i ∈ {1, 2}. We first define a function
related to an exponential upper bound of pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi
).
Let Xi be an arbitrary random variable over Xi and has a
probability distribution pXi . Let P(Xi) denote the set of all
probability distributions on Xi. For Ri ≥ 0 and pXi ∈ P(Xi),
we define the following function:
E(Ri|pXi) : = min
p
Xi
∈P(Xi)
{[Ri −H(Xi)]
+ +D(pXi ||pXi)}.
We next define a function related to an exponential upper
bound of∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
, pnZK1K2). For each i =
1, 2, 3, we define a set of probability distributions on U ×Z
×Xi by
Q(pKi|Z) :={qi = qUZKi : qKiZ|U = pKiZ|U
for some pi ∈ P˜(pZKi)}.
For each i = 1, 2, 3, for (µ, α) ∈ [0, 1]2, and for qi = qUZKi ∈
Q(pKi|Z), define
ω
(µ,α)
qi|pZ
(z, ki|u) := α¯ log
qZ(z)
pZ(z)
+ α
[
µ log
qZ|U (z|u)
pZ(z)
+µ¯ log
1
qKi|U (ki|u)
]
,
Ω(µ,α)(qi|pZ) := − logEq
[
exp
{
−ω
(µ,α)
qi|pZ
(Z,Ki|U)
}]
,
Ω(µ,α)(pZKi) := min
qi∈Q(pKi|Z)
Ω(µ,α)(qi|pZ),
F (µ,α)(µRA + µ¯Ri|pZKi)
:=
Ω
(µ,α)
i (pKi ,W )− α(µRA + µ¯Ri)
2 + αµ¯
,
F (RA, Ri|pZKi)
:= sup
(µ,α)∈[0,1]2
F (µ,α)(µRA + µ¯Ri|pZKi).
We next define a function serving as a lower bound of
F (RA, Ri|pZKi), i = 1, 2, 3. For each i = 1, 2, 3, and for
each pi ∈ P˜(pZKi), define
ω˜(µ)pi (z, ki|u) := µ log
pZ|U (z|u)
pZ(z)
+ µ¯ log
1
pKi|U (Ki|U)
,
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi) := − log Ep
[
exp
{
−λω˜(µ)pi (Z,Ki|U)
}]
.
Furthermore, set
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pZKi) := min
pi∈P˜(pZKi )
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi),
F˜ (µ,λ)(µRA + µ¯Ri|pZKi)
:=
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pZKi)− λ(µRA + µ¯Ri)
2 + λ(5 − µ)
,
F˜ (RA, Ri|pZKi) := sup
λ≥0,
µ∈[0,1]
F˜ (µ,λ)(µRA + µ¯Ri|pZKi).
We can show that the above functions satisfy the following
property.
Property 1:
a) For each i = 1, 2, 3, the cardinality bound |U| ≤
|Z| in Q(pKi|Z) is sufficient to describe the quantity
Ω(µ,α)(pZKi). Furthermore, the cardinality bound |U| ≤
|Z| in Psh(pZK1K2) is sufficient to describe the quantity
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pZK1K2).
b) For i = 1, 2, 3 and for any RA, Ri ≥ 0, we have
F (RA, R|pZKi) ≥ F˜ (RA, Ri|pZKi).
c) For i = 1, 2, 3 and for any pi ∈ Psh(pZKi) and any
(µ, λ) ∈ [0, 1]2, we have
0 ≤ Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi) ≤ µ log |Z|+ µ¯ log |Ki|. (11)
d) Fix any p = pUZK ∈ Psh(pK ,W ) and µ ∈ [0, 1]. For
λ ∈ [0, 1], we define a probability distribution p
(λ)
i =
p
(λ)
UZKi
by
p
(λ)
i (u, z, ki) :=
pi(u, z, ki) exp
{
−λω˜
(µ)
pi (z, ki|u)
}
Epi
[
exp
{
−λω˜
(µ)
pi (Z,Ki|U)
}] .
Then for each i = 1, 2, 3 and for λ ∈ [0, 1/2], Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi)
is twice differentiable. Furthermore, for λ ∈ [0, 1/2], we
have
d
dλ
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi) = Epi(λ)
[
ω˜(µ)pi (Z,Ki|U)
]
,
d2
dλ2
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi) = −Varp(λ)
i
[
ω˜(µ)pi (Z,Ki|U)
]
.
The second equality implies that Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi|pZKi) is a
concave function of λ ≥ 0.
e) For (µ, λ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1/2], define
ρ(µ,λ)(pZKi)
:= max
(ν,pi)∈[0,λ]
×P˜(pZKi ):
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pi)
=Ω˜(µ,λ)(pZKi )
Var
p
(ν)
i
[
ω˜(µ)pi (Z,Ki|U)
]
,
and set
ρ(pZKi) := max
(µ,λ)∈[0,1]×[0,1/2]
ρ(µ,λ)(pZKi).
Then we have ρ(pZKi) < ∞. Furthermore, for any
(µ, λ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1/2], we have
Ω˜(µ,λ)(pZKi) ≥ λR
(µ)(pZKi)−
λ2
2
ρ(pZKi).
f) For every τ ∈ (0, (1/2)ρ(pZKi), the condition (RA, R+
τ) /∈ R(pZKi) implies
F˜ (RA, R|pZKi) >
ρ(pZKi )
4 · g
2
(
τ
ρ(pZKi )
)
> 0,
where g is the inverse function of ϑ(a) := a +
(5/4)a2, a ≥ 0.
Proof of this property is found in Oohama [2](extended
version). We set
Fmin(RA, R1, R2|pZK1K2) := min
i=1,2,3
F (RA, Ri|pZKi).
Our main result is as follows.
Theorem 1: For any RA, R1, R2 > 0 and any pZK1K2 ,
there exists two sequence of mappings {(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )}
∞
n=1, i =
1, 2 such that for any pXi , i = 1, 2, and any n ≥ (R1+R2)
−1,
we have
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri,
pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi) ≤ e
−n[E(Ri|pXi )−δi,n], i = 1, 2 (12)
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
K1K2 ,W
n)
≤ e−n[Fmin(RA,R1,R2|pZK1K2 )−δ3,n], (13)
where δi,n, i = 1, 2, 3 are defined by
δi,n :=
1
n
log
[
e(n+ 1)2|Xi|
×
{
1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|
}]
, for i = 1, 2,
δ3,n :=
1
n
log
[
15n(R1 +R2)
×
{
1 + (n+ 1)|X |1 + (n+ 1)|X |2
}]
.
Note that for i = 1, 2, 3, δi,n → 0 as n→∞.
This theorem is proved by a coupling of two techniques.
One is a technique Oohama [3] developed for deriving approx-
imation error exponents for the intrinsic randomness problem
in the framework of distributed random number extraction,
which was posed by the author. This technique is used in the
security analysis for the privacy amplification of distributed
encrypted sources with correlated keys posed and investigated
by Santoso and Oohama [4], [5]. The other is a technique
Oohama [2] developed for establishing exponential strong
converse theorem for the one helper source coding problem.
This technique is used in the security analysis for the side
channel attacks to the Shannon cipher system posed and
investigated by Oohama and Santoso [6], [7].
The functions E(Ri|pXi) and F (RA, R1, R2|pZK1K2) take
positive values if (RA, R1, R2) belongs to the set
{R1 > H(X1)} ∩ {R2 > H(X2)}
⋂
i=1,2,3
Rci (pZKi)
:= R
(in)
Sys (pX1X2 , pZK1K2).
Thus, by Theorem 1, under
(RA, R1, R2) ∈ R
(in)
Sys (pX1X2 , pZK1K2),
we have the followings:
• On the reliability, for i = 1, 2, pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi
) goes to
zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent
is lower bounded by the function E(Ri|pXi).
• On the security, for any ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA
), the information leakage ∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
,
pnZK1K2) on X
n
1 , X
n
2 goes to zero exponentially as n
tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by
the function Fmin(RA, R1, R2|pZK1K2).
• For each i = 1, 2, the code (φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ) that attains the
exponent function E(Ri|pXi) is a universal code that
depends only on Ri not on the value of the distribution
pXi .
Define
D
(in)
Sys (pX1X1 , pZK1K2) := {(RA, R1, R2,
E(R1|pX1), E(R2|pX2), Fmin(RA, R1, R2|pK1K2)) :
(R1, R2) ∈ R
(in)
Sys (pX1X2 , pZK1K2)}.
From Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1:
R
(in)
Sys (pX1X1 , pZK1K2) ⊆ RSys(pX1X1 , pZK1K2),
D
(in)
Sys (pX1X1 , pZK1K2) ⊆ DSys(pX1X1 , pZK1K2).
In the remaining part of this section, we give two simple
examples of R
(in)
Sys (pX1X1 , pZK1K2). Those correspond two
extrimal cases on the correlation of (K1,K2, Z). In those
two examples, we assume that X1 = X2 = {0, 1} and
pX1(1) = s1, pX2(1) = s2. We further assume that pK1,K2
has the binary symmetric distribution given by
pK1K2(k1, k2) = (1/2)
[
ρ¯k1 ⊕ k2 + ρk1 ⊕ k2
]
for (k1, k2) ∈ {0, 1}
2,
where ρ ∈ [0, 0.5] is a parameter indicating the correlation
level of (K1,K2).
Example 1: We consider the case where W = pZ|K1K2 is
given by
W (z|k1, k2) =W (z|k1) = ρAk1 ⊕ z + ρAk1 ⊕ z
for (k1, k2, z) ∈ {0, 1}
3.
In this case we have K2 ↔ K1 ↔ Z . This corresponds to
the case where the adversary A attacks only node L1. Let
NA be a binary random variable with pNA(1) = ρA. We
assume that NA is independent of (X1, X2) and (K1,K2).
Using NA, Z can be written as Z = K1 ⊕ NA. The inner
bound for this example denoted by R
(in)
Sys,ex1(pX1X2 , pZK1K2)
is the following.
R
(in)
Sys,ex1(pX1X2 , pZK1K2) = {(RA, R1, R2) :
0 ≤ RA ≤ 1− h(θ), h(s1) < R1 < h(ρA ∗ θ),
h(s2) < R2 < h ((ρ ∗ ρA) ∗ θ) ,
R1 +R2 < h(ρ) + h(ρA ∗ θ) for some θ ∈ [0, 1]},
where h(·) denotes the binary entropy function and a ∗ b :=
ab¯+ a¯b.
Example 2:We consider the case of ρ = 0.5. In this caseK1
and K2 is independent. In this case we have no information
leakage if RA = 0. We assume that W = pZ|K1K2 is given
by
W (z|k1, k2) = ρAk1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ z + ρAk1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ z
for (k1, k2, z) ∈ {0, 1}
3.
Let NA be the same random variable as the previous example.
Using NA, Z can be written as Z = K1⊕K2⊕NA. The inner
bound in this example denoted by R
(in)
Sys,ex2( pX1X2 , pZK1K2)
is the following:
R
(in)
Sys,ex2(pX1X2 , pZK1K2) = {(RA, R1, R2) :
0 ≤ RA ≤ 1− h(θ), h(si) < Ri < 1, i = 1, 2,
R1 +R2 < 1 + h(ρA ∗ θ) for some θ ∈ [0, 1]}.
For the above two examples, we show the section of the
regions R
(in)
Sys,exi( pX1X2 , pZK1K2) i =, 1, 2 by the plane
{RA = 1− h(θ)} is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Shape of the regions R
(in)
Sys,exi(pX1X2 , pZK1K2 ) ∩{RA = 1 −
h(θ)},i =, 1, 2.
V. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
In this section we prove Theorem 1.
A. Types of Sequences and Their Properties
In this subsection we prepare basic results on the types.
Those results are basic tools for our analysis of several bounds
related to error provability of decoding or security.
Definition 5: For each i = 1, 2 and for any n-sequence xni =
xi,1xi,2 · · · xi,n ∈ X
n, n(xi|x
n
i ) denotes the number of t such
that xi,t = xi. The relative frequency {n(xi|x
n
i )/n}xi∈Xi of
the components of xni is called the type of x
n denoted by
Pxn . The set that consists of all the types on X is denoted
by Pn(X ). Let Xi denote an arbitrary random variable whose
distribution PXi belongs to Pn(Xi). For pXi ∈ Pn(Xi), set
T n
Xi
:=
{
xni : Pxni = pXi
}
.
For set of types and joint types the following lemma holds.
For the detail of the proof see Csiszár and Körner [8].
Lemma 1:
a) |Pn(Xi)| ≤ (n+ 1)
|Xi|.
b) For PXi ∈ Pn(Xi),
(n+ 1)−|Xi|enH(Xi) ≤ |T n
Xi
| ≤ enH(Xi).
c) For xni ∈ T
n
Xi
,
pnXi(x
n
i ) = e
−n[H(Xi)+D(pXi
||pXi )].
By Lemma 1 parts b) and c), we immediately obtain the
following lemma:
Lemma 2: For pXi ∈ Pn(Xi),
pnXi(T
n
Xi
) ≤ e−nD(pXi ||pXi ).
B. Upper Bounds on Reliablity and Security
In this subsection we evaluate upper bounds of pe(φ
(n)
i ,
ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi
), i = 1, 2, and ∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
, pZK1
K2Un). For pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi
), we derive an upper bound
which can be characterized with a quantity depending on
(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ) and type Pxni of sequences x
n
i ∈ X
n
i . We first
evaluate pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi
), i = 1, 2. For xni ∈ X
n
i and
pX ∈ Pn(Xi) we define the following functions.
Ξxn
i
(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ) :=
1 if ψ
(n)
i
(
φ
(n)
i (x
n
i )
)
6= xni ,
0 otherwise,
ΞXi(φ
(n), ψ(n)) :=
1
|T n
Xi
|
∑
xn
i
∈Tn
Xi
Ξxn
i
(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ).
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: In the proposed system, for i = 1, 2 and for any
pair of (φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ), we have
pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi)
≤
∑
pXi
∈Pn(Xi)
ΞX(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )e
−nD(pXi
||pXi ). (14)
Proof of this lemma is found in [6]. We omit the proof.
We next discuss upper bounds of
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2)
= I(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 ,M
(n)
A ;X
n
1X
n
2 ).
On an upper bound of I(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 ,M
(n)
A ;X
n
1X
n
2 ), we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 4:
I(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 ,M
(n)
A ;X
n
1X
n
2 )
≤D
(
p
K
m1
1 K
m2
2 |M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm11 Vm22 ∣∣∣ pM(n)A ) , (15)
where pVm11 V
m2
2
represents the uniform distribution over
Xm11 × X
m2
2 .
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(C˜m11 C˜
m2
2 ,M
(n)
A ;X
n
1X
n
2 )
(a)
= I(C˜m21 C˜
m2
2 ;X
n
1X
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
≤ log(|Xm11 ||X
m2
2 |)−H(C˜
m1
1 C˜
m2
2 |X
n
1X
n
2 ,M
(n)
A )
(b)
= log(|Xm11 ||X
m2
2 |)−H(K˜
m1
1 K˜
m2
2 |X
n
1X
n
2 ,M
(n)
A )
(c)
= log(|Xm11 ||X
m2
2 |)−H(K˜
m1
1 K˜
m2
2 |M
(n)
A )
= D
(
p
K
m1
1 K
m2
2 |M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm11 Vm22 ∣∣∣ pM(n)A ) .
Step (a) follows from (Xn1 , X
n
2 ) ⊥ M
(n)
A . Step (b) follows
from that for i = 1, 2, C˜mii = K˜
mi
i ⊕ X˜
mi
i and X˜
mi
i =
φ
(n)
i (X
n
i ). Step (c) follows from (K˜
m1
1 , K˜
m2
2 , M
(n)
A ) ⊥ (X
n
1 ,
Xn2 ).
C. Random Coding Arguments
We construct a pair of affine encoders (ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 ) using the
random coding method. For the two decoders ψ
(n)
i , i = 1, 2,
we propose the minimum entropy decoder used in Csiszár [9]
and Oohama and Han [10].
Random Construction of Affine Encoders: For each i = 1, 2,
we first choose mi such that
mi :=
⌊
nRi
log |Xi|
⌋
,
where ⌊a⌋ stands for the integer part of a. It is obvious that
for i = 1, 2,
Ri −
1
n
≤
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri.
By the definition (2) of φ
(n)
i , we have that for x
n
i ∈ X
n
i ,
φ
(n)
i (x
n
i ) = x
n
i Ai,
where Ai is a matrix with n rows and mi columns. By the
definition (3) of ϕ
(n)
i , we have that for k
n
i ∈ X
n
i ,
ϕ
(n)
i (k
n
i ) = k
n
i Ai + b
mi
i ,
where for each i = 1, 2, bmii is a vector with mi columns.
Entries of Ai and b
mi
i are from the field of Xi. Those entries
are selected at random, independently of each other and with
uniform distribution. Randomly constructed linear encoder
φ
(n)
i and affine encoder ϕ
(n)
i have three properties shown in
the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Properties of Linear/Affine Encoders): For each
i = 1, 2, we have the following:
a) For any xni , v
n
i ∈ X
n
i with x
n
i 6= v
n
i , we have
Pr[φ
(n)
i (x
n
i ) = φ
(n)
i (v
n
i )] = Pr[(x
n
i ⊖ v
n
i )A = 0
mi ]
= |X |−mi . (16)
b) For any sni ∈ X
n
i , and for any s˜
mi
i ∈ X
mi , we have
Pr[ϕ
(n)
i (s
n
i ) = s˜
mi
i ] = Pr[s
nAi ⊕ b
mi
i = s˜
mi
i ]
= |Xi|
−mi . (17)
c) For any sni , t
n
i ∈ X
n
i with s
n
i 6= t
n
i , and for any s˜
mi
i ∈
Xmii , we have
Pr[ϕ
(n)
i (s
n
i ) = ϕ
(n)
i (t
n
i ) = s˜
mi
i ]
= Pr[sni Ai ⊕ b
mi
i = t
n
i Ai ⊕ b
mi
i = s˜
mi
i ]
= |Xi|
−2mi . (18)
Proof of this lemma is found in [6]. We omit the proof.
We next define the decoder function ψ
(n)
i : X
mi
i → X
n
i , i =
1, 2. To this end we define the following quantities.
Definition 6: For xni ∈ X
n
i , we denote the entropy calculated
from the type Pxn
i
by H(xni ). In other words, for a type PXi ∈
Pn(Xi) such that PXi = Pxni , we define H(x
n
i ) = H(Xi).
Minimum Entropy Decoder: For each i = 1, 2, and for
φ
(n)
i (x
n
i ) = x˜
mi
i , we define the decoder function ψ
(n)
i :
Xmii → X
n
i as follows:
ψ
(n)
i (x˜
mi
i ) :=

x̂ni if φ
(n)
i (x̂
n
i ) = x˜
mi
i ,
and H(x̂ni ) < H(xˇ
n
i )
for all xˇni such that
φ
(n)
i (xˇ
n
i ) = x˜
mi
i ,
and xˇni 6= x̂
n
i ,
arbitrary if there is no such x̂ni ∈ X
n
i .
Error Probability Bound: In the following arguments we let
expectations based on the random choice of the affine encoders
ϕ
(n)
i i = 1, 2 be denoted by E[·]. For, i = 1, 2, define
ΠXi(Ri) := e
−n[Ri−H(Xi)]
+
.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: For each i = 1, 2, for any n and for any PXi ∈
Pn(Xi),
E
[
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )
]
≤ e(n+ 1)|Xi|ΠX(Ri).
Proof of this lemma is found in [6]. We omit the proof.
Estimation of Approximation Error: Define
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
:=
∑
(a,kn1 ,k
n
2 )
∈M
(n)
A ×X
n
1 ×X
n
2
p
M
(n)
A K
n(a, k
n
1 , k
n
2 )
× log
[
1 + (enR1 − 1)p
Kn1 |M
(n)
A
(kn1 |a)
+ (enR2 − 1)p
Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(kn2 |a)
+(enR1 − 1)(enR2 − 1)p
Kn1 K
n
2 |M
(n)
A
(kn1 , k
n
2 |a)
]
.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: For i = 1, 2 and for any n,mi satisfying
(mi/n) log |Xi| ≤ Ri, we have
E
[
D
(
p
K˜m1K˜m2 |M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm11 Vm22 ∣∣∣ pM(n)A )]
≤ Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2). (19)
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. From the
bound (19) in Lemma (7), we know that the quantity Θ(R1,
R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
) serves as an upper bound of the ensem-
ble average of the conditional divergence D(p
K˜
m1
1 K˜
m2
2 |M
(n)
A
||pVm11 V
m2
2
|p
M
(n)
A
).
From Lemmas 4 and 7, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2:
E
[
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2)
]
≤ Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2).
Existence of Universal Code {(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )}i=1,2:
From Lemma 6 and Corollary 2, we have the fol-
lowing lemma stating an existence of universal code
{(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )}i=1,2.
Lemma 8: There exists at least one deterministic code
{(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )}i=1,2 satisfying (mi/n) log |Xi| ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2,
such that for i = 1, 2 and for any pXi ∈ Pn(Xi),
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ) ≤ e(n+ 1)
|Xi|
× {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}ΠXi(Ri).
Furthermore, for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2)
≤ {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2).
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
E
[
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
, pnZK1K2)
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
)
+
∑
i=1,2
∑
p
Xi
∈Pn(Xi)
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )
e(n+ 1)|Xi|ΠXi(Ri)

=
E
[
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
, pnZK1K2)
]
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
)
+
∑
i=1,2
∑
pXi
∈Pn(Xi)
E
[
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )
]
e(n+ 1)|Xi|ΠXi(Ri)
(a)
≤ 1 +
∑
i=1,2
∑
p
Xi
∈Pn(Xi)
1
(b)
≤ 1 +
∑
i=1,2
(n+ 1)|Xi|.
Step (a) follows from Lemma 6 and Corollary 2. Step (b)
follows from Lemma 1 part a). Hence there exists at least one
deterministic code {(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )}i=1,2 such that
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
, pnZK1K2)
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
)
+
∑
i=1,2
∑
pXi
∈Pn(Xi)
1
×
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )
e(n+ 1)|Xi|ΠXi(Ri)
≤ 1 +
∑
i=1,2
(n+ 1)|Xi|,
from which we have that for i = 1, 2 and for any pXi ∈
Pn(Xi),
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )
e(n+ 1)|Xi|ΠXi(Ri)
≤ 1 +
∑
i=1,2
(n+ 1)|Xi|.
Furthermore, we have that for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA),
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2
, pnZK1K2)
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
)
≤ 1 +
∑
i=1,2
(n+ 1)|Xi|,
completing the proof.
Proposition 1: For any RA, R1, R2 > 0, and any pZK1K2 ,
there exist two sequences of mappings {(ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i )}
∞
n=1, i =
1, 2 such that for i = 1, 2 and for any pXi ∈ P(Xi), we have
1
n
log |Xmii | =
mi
n
log |Xi| ≤ Ri,
pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi) ≤ e(n+ 1)
2|Xi|
× {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}e−nE(Ri|pXi ) (20)
and for any eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈
F
(n)
A (RA), we have
∆(n)(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2)
≤ {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}
×Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2). (21)
Proof: By Lemma 8, there exists (ϕ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ), i = 1, 2,
satisfying (mi/n) log |Xi| ≤ Ri, such that for i = 1, 2 and for
any pXi ∈ Pn(Xi),
ΞXi(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i ) ≤ e(n+ 1)
|Xi|
× {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}ΠX(Ri). (22)
Furthermore for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA),
∆n(ϕ
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
X1X2 , p
n
ZK1K2)
≤ {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}
×Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2). (23)
The bound (21) in Proposition 1 has already been proved in
(23). Hence it suffices to prove the bound (20) in Propo-
sition 1 to complete the proof. On an upper bound of
pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi
), i = 1, 2, we have the following chain of
inequalities:
pe(φ
(n)
i , ψ
(n)
i |p
n
Xi)
(a)
≤ e(n+ 1)|Xi|
× {1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}
×
∑
p
Xi
∈Pn(Xi)
ΠXi(Ri)e
−nD(p
Xi
||pXi )
≤ e(n+ 1)|Xi|{(n+ 1)|Xi| + 1}|Pn(Xi)|e
−nE(Ri|pXi )
(b)
≤ e(n+ 1)2|Xi|{1 + (n+ 1)|X1| + (n+ 1)|X2|}
× e−nE(Ri|pXi ).
Step (a) follows from Lemma 3 and (22). Step (b) follows
from Lemma 1 part a).
D. Explicit Upper Bound of Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
)
In this subsection we derive an explicit upper bound of
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2
) which holds for any eavesdropper
A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA). Define
℘0 := pM(n)A ZnKn1 Kn2
{
R1 ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn1 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 |M
(n)
A )
− η
or
R2 ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn2 |M
(n)
A )
− η2
or
R1 +R2 ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn1 K
n
2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
− η3
}
.
For i = 1, 2, define
℘i := pM(n)A ZnKni
{
Ri ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn
i
|M
(n)
A
(Kni |M
(n)
A )
− ηi
 .
Furthermore, define
℘3 := pM(n)A ZnKn1 Kn2
{
R1 +R2 ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn1 K
n
2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
− η3
 .
By definition it is obvious that
℘0 ≤
3∑
i=1
℘i. (24)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 9: For any ηi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 and for any
eavesdropper A with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), we
have the following:
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
≤ n(R1 +R2)℘0 +
3∑
i=1
e−nηi (25)
≤ n(R1 +R2)
[
3∑
i=1
℘i
]
+
3∑
i=1
e−nηi (26)
Specifically, if n ≥ [R1 +R2]
−1, we have
(n[R1 +R2])
−1Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
≤
3∑
i=1
(℘i + e
−nηi). (27)
Proof: By (24), it sufficies to show (25) to prove Lemma
9. We set
AR1,R2(K
n
1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
:= (enR1 − 1)p
Kn1 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 |M
(n)
A )
+ (enR2 − 1)p
Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn2 |M
(n)
A )
+ (enR1 − 1)(enR2 − 1)p
Kn1 K
n
2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A ).
Then we have
Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
= E
[
log
{
1 +AR1,R2(K
n
1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
}]
. (28)
We further observe the following:

R1 <
1
n
log
1
p
K1Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η1
R2 <
1
n
log
1
p
K1Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η2
R1 +R2 <
1
n
log
1
p
K1Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn|M
(n)
A )
− η3
⇒ AR1,R2(K
n
1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A ) <
3∑
i=1
e−nηi
(a)
⇒ log
{
1 +AR1,R2(K
n
1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
}
≤
3∑
i=1
e−nηi . (29)
Step (a) follows from log(1 + a) ≤ a. We also note that
log
{
1 + (enR1 − 1)p
Kn1 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 |M
(n)
A )
+ (enR2 − 1)p
Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn2 |M
(n)
A )
+ (enR1 − 1)(enR2 − 1)
× p
Kn1 K
n
2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
}
≤ log[enR1enR2 ] = n(R1 +R2). (30)
From (28), (29), (30), we have the bound (25).
On upper bound of ℘i, i = 1, 2, 3, we have the following
lemma:
Lemma 10: For any η > 0 and for any eavesdropper A
with ϕA satisfying ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA), we have that for each
i = 1, 2, we have ℘i ≤ ℘˜i, where
℘˜i := pM(n)A ZnKni
{
0 ≥
1
n
log
qˆ
i,M
(n)
A Z
nKn
i
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kni )
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kni )
− ηi, (31)
0 ≥
1
n
log
Qi,Zn(Z
n)
pZn(Zn)
− ηi, (32)
RA ≥
1
n
log
Q
i,Zn|M
(n)
A
(Zn|M
(n)
A )
pZn(Zn)
− ηi, (33)
Ri ≥
1
n
log
1
Q
(n)
i,Kn
i
|MA
(Kni |M
(n)
A )
− ηi
}
+ 3e−nηi . (34)
and that for i = 3, we have ℘3 ≤ ℘˜3, where
℘˜3 := pM(n)A ZnKn1 Kn2
{
0 ≥
1
n
log
qˆ
3,M
(n)
A Z
nKn1 K
n
2
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn1 ,K
n
2 )
p
M
(n)
A Z
nKn1 K
n
2
(M
(n)
A , Z
n,Kn1K
n
2 )
− η3,
(35)
0 ≥
1
n
log
Q3,Zn(Z
n)
pZn(Zn)
− η3, (36)
RA ≥
1
n
log
Q˜
3,Zn|M
(n)
A
(Zn|M
(n)
A )
pZn(Zn)
− η3, (37)
R1 + R2 ≥
1
n
log
1
p
Kn1 K
n
2 |M
(n)
A
(Kn1 ,K
n
2 |M
(n)
A )
− η3
}
+ 3e−nη3 . (38)
The probability distributions appearing in the three inequalities
(31), (32), and (33) in the right members of (34) have a
property that we can select them arbitrary. In (31), we can
choose any probability distribution qˆ
i,M
(n)
A Z
nKn
i
on M
(n)
A
×Zn ×Xni . In (32), we can choose any distribution Qi,Zn on
Zn. In (33), we can choose any stochastic matrix Q˜
i,Zn|M
(n)
A
:
M
(n)
A → Z
n. The probability distributions appearing in the
three inequalities (35), (36), and (37) in the right members of
(38) have a property that we can select them arbitrary. In (35),
we can choose any probability distribution qˆ
3,M
(n)
A Z
nKn1 K
n
2
on
M
(n)
A ×Z
n ×Xn1 ×X
n
2 . In (36), we can choose any distri-
bution Q3,Zn on Z
n. In (37), we can choose any stochastic
matrix Q˜
3,Zn|M
(n)
A
: M
(n)
A → Z
n.
The above lemma is the same as Lemma 10 in the previous
work [6]. Since the proof of the lemma is in [6], we omit
the proof of Lemma 10 in the present paper. We have the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: For any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA) and any n ≥
[R1 +R2]
−1, we have
(n[R1 +R2])
−1Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
≤ 15e−nFmin(RA,R1,R2|pZK1K2 ). (39)
Proof: By Lemmas 9 and 10, we have for any
(n[R1 +R2])
−1Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
≤
3∑
i=1
(℘˜i + e
−nηi). (40)
The quantity ℘˜i + e
−nηi , i = 1, 2, 3. is the same as the upper
bound on the correct probability of decoding for one helper
source coding problem in Lemma 1 in Oohama [2](extended
version). In a manner similar to the derivation of the expo-
nential upper bound of the correct probability of decoding for
one helper source coding problem, we can prove that for any
ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA) there exist η
∗
i , i = 1, 2, 3 such that for
i = 1, 2, 3, we have
℘˜i + e
−nη∗i ≤ 5e−nF (RA,Ri|pZKi ). (41)
From (40) and (41), we have that for any ϕ
(n)
A ∈ F
(n)
A (RA)
and any n ≥ [R1 +R2]
−1,
(n[R1 +R2])
−1Θ(R1, R2, ϕ
(n)
A |p
n
ZK1K2)
≤ 5
3∑
i=1
e−nF (RA,Ri|pZKi ) ≤ 15e−nFmin(RA,R1,R2|pZK1K2 ),
completing the proof.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 7
In this appendix we prove Lemma 7. This lemma immedi-
ately follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 11: For i = 1, 2 and for any n,mi satisfying
(mi/n) log |Xi| ≤ Ri, we have
E
[
D
(
p
K˜m1K˜m2 |M
(n)
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣ pVm1Vm2 ∣∣∣ pM(n)A )]
≤
∑
(a,kn1 ,k
n
2 )
∈M
(n)
A ×X
n
1 ×X
n
2
p
M
(n)
A K
n(a, k
n
1 , k
n
2 )
× log
[
1 + (|Xm11 | − 1)pKn1 |M
(n)
A
(kn1 |a)
+ (|Xm22 | − 1)pKn2 |M
(n)
A
(kn2 |a)
+(|Xm11 | − 1)(|X
m2
2 | − 1)pKn1 Kn2 |M
(n)
A
(kn1 , k
n
2 |a)
]
. (42)
In fact, from |Xmii | ≤ e
nRi and (42) in Lemma 11, we
have the bound (19) in Lemma 7. In this appendix we prove
Lemma 11. In the following arguments, we use the following
simplified notations:
kni ,K
n
i ∈ X
n
i =⇒ ki,Ki ∈ Ki
k˜mii , K˜
mi
i ∈ X
mi
i =⇒ li, Li ∈ Li
ϕ
(n)
i : X
n
i → X
mi
i =⇒ ϕi : Ki → Li
ϕ
(n)
i (k
n
i ) = k
n
i Ai + b
mi
i =⇒ ϕi(ki) = kiAi + bi
Vmii ∈ X
mi
i =⇒ Vi ∈ Li
M
(n)
A ∈M
(n)
A =⇒M ∈M.
We define
χl′,l =
{
1, if l′ = l,
0, if l′ 6= l.
Then, the conditional distribution of the random pair (L1, L2)
for given M = a ∈ M is
pL1L2|M (l|a) =
∑
k∈K
pK1K2|M (k1, k2|a)χϕ1(k1),l1χϕ2(k2),l2
for (l1, l2) ∈ L1 × L2.
Set
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2) := χϕ1(k1),l1χϕ2(k2),l2
× log
|L1||L2|

∑
(k′1,k
′
2)
∈K1×K2
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k
′
2|a)
× χϕ1(k′1),l1χϕ2(k′2),l2

.
Then the conditional divergence between pL1L2|M and pV1V2
for given M is given by
D
(
pL1L2|M
∣∣∣∣ pV1V2 ∣∣ pM) = ∑
(a,k1,k2)
∈M×K1×K2
∑
(l1,l2)
∈L1×L2
1
× pMK1K2(a, k1, k2)Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2). (43)
The quantity Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2) has the following form:
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2) = χϕ1(k1),l1χϕ2(k2),l2
× log
|L1||L2|
pK1K2|M (k1, k2|a)χϕ1(k1),l1χϕ2(k2),l2
+
∑
k′2∈{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k1, k
′
2|a)χϕ1(k1),l1χϕ2(k′2),l2
+
∑
k′1∈{k1}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k2|a)χϕ1(k′1),l1χϕ2(k2),l2
+
∑
(k′1,k
′
2)
∈{k1}
c×{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k
′
2|a)χϕ1(k′1),l1χϕ2(k′2),l2

.
(44)
The above form is useful for computing E[Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1)
,(ϕ2(k2),l2)].
Proof of Lemma 11: Taking expectation of both side of
(44) with respect to the random choice of the entry of the
matrix Ai and the vector bi representing the affine encoder ϕ,
we have
E
[
D
(
pL1L2|M
∣∣∣∣ pV1V2 ∣∣ pM)] = ∑
(a,k1,k2)
∈M×K1×K2
∑
(l1,l2)
∈L1×L2
1
× pMK1K2(a, k1, k2)E
[
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2)
]
. (45)
To compute the expectation E
[
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2)
]
, we
introduce an expectation operator useful for the com-
putation. Let Eϕ1(k1)=lk1 ,ϕ2(k2)=lk2 [·] be an expectation
operator based on the conditional probability measures
Pr (·|ϕ1(k1) = lk1 , ϕ2(k2) = lk2). Using this expectation op-
erator, the quantity E
[
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2)
]
can be written
as
E
[
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2)
]
=
∑
(lk1 ,lk2 )
∈L1×L2
Pr (ϕ1(k1) = lk1 , ϕ2(k2) = lk2)
× Eϕ1(k1)=lk1 ,ϕ2(k2)=lk2
[
Υ(lk1 ,l1),(lk2 ,l2)
]
. (46)
Note that
Υ(lk1 ,l1),(lk2 ,l2) =
{
1, if ϕ1(k1) = l1, ϕ2(k2) = l2,
0, otherwise.
(47)
From (46) and (47), we have
E
[
Υ(ϕ1(k1),l1),(ϕ2(k2),l2)
]
= Pr (ϕ1(k1) = l1, ϕ2(k2) = l2)
× Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,l2)
]
=
1
|L1||L2|
Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,l2)
]
. (48)
Using (44), the expectation Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,
l2)
]
can be written as
Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,l2)
]
= Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
 log
|L1||L2|
pK1K2|M (k1, k2|a)
+
∑
k′2∈{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k1, k
′
2|a)χϕ2(k′2),l2
+
∑
k′1∈{k1}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k2|a)χϕ1(k′1),l1
+
∑
(k′1,k
′
2)
∈{k1}
c×{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k
′
2|a)χϕ1(k′1),l1χϕ2(k′2),l2


.
(49)
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the right member of (49),
we obtain the following upper bound of Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(
k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,l2)
]
Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,l2)
]
≤ log
|L1||L2|
pK1K2|M (k1, k2|a)
+
∑
k′2∈{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k1, k
′
2|a)E2
+
∑
k′1∈{k1}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k2|a)E1
+
∑
(k′1,k
′
2)
∈{k1}
c×{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k
′
2|a)E12

, (50)
where we set
E1 := Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
χϕ1(k′1),l1
]
,
E2 := Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
χϕ2(k′2),l2
]
,
E12 := Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
χϕ1(k′1),l1χϕ2(k′2),l2
]
.
Computing E1, we have
E1 = Pr (ϕ1(k
′
1) = l1|ϕ1(k1) = l1, ϕ2(k2) = l2)
(a)
= Pr (ϕ1(k
′
1) = l1|ϕ1(k1) = l1)
(b)
=
1
|L1|
. (51)
Step (a) follows from that the random constructions of ϕ1 and
ϕ2 are independent. Step (b) follows from Lemma 5 parts b)
and c). In a similar manner we compute E2 to obtain
E2 =
1
|L2|
. (52)
We further compute E12 to obtain
E12 = Pr (ϕ1(k
′
1) = l1, ϕ2(k
′
2) = l2
|ϕ1(k1) = l1, ϕ2(k2) = l2)
(a)
= Pr (ϕ1(k
′
1) = l1|ϕ1(k1) = l1)
× Pr (ϕ2(k
′
2) = l2|ϕ2(k2) = l2)
(b)
=
1
|L1||L2|
. (53)
Step (a) follows from that the random constructuions of ϕ1
and ϕ2 are independent. Step (b) follows from Lemma 5 parts
b) and c), From (50)-(53), we have
Eϕ1(k1)=l1,ϕ2(k2)=l2
[
Υ(l1,l1),(l2,l2)
]
≤ log
|L1||L2|
pK1K2|M (k1, k2|a)
+
∑
k′2∈{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k1, k
′
2|a)
1
|L2|
+
∑
k′1∈{k1}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k2|a)
1
|L1|
+
∑
(k′1,k
′
2)
∈{k1}
c×{k2}
c
pK1K2|M (k
′
1, k
′
2|a)
1
|L1||L2|


= log
{
1 + (|L1| − 1)pK1|M (k1|a)
+ (|L2| − 1)pK2|M (k2|a)
+ (|L1| − 1)(|L2| − 1)pK1K2|M (k1, k2|a)
}
. (54)
From (45), (48), and (54), we have the bound (42) in Lemma
11.
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